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The Unbureaucratic Personality 
 
After sixty years of scholarship on the rule-bound bureaucratic personality, this article 
turns attention to the unbureaucratic personality. Identified by a willingness to bend rules, 
the unbureaucratic personality is thought to be influenced by individual and workplace 
attributes, each which shed light on the nature of rule-bending. Individual attributes 
investigated include nonconformity, risk propensity, and public service commitment, all 
expected to stimulate the unbureaucratic personality. Workplace attributes include 
formalization and centralization, which are expected to suppress the unbureaucratic 
personality, and red tape, which is expected to trigger it. These hypotheses are tested 
using mail survey data collected from employees of four cities in a Midwestern state. The 
results of ordered probit modeling of the data suggest that nonconformity and risk taking 
increase the unbureaucratic personality, as do red tape and centralized workplaces. By 
contrast, the unbureaucratic personality appears to be lowered by public service 
commitment and workplace formalization. The implications of these results for the 
normative aspects of rule-bending are discussed.  
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The Unbureaucratic Personality 
The bureaucratic personality has been a topic of scholarly inquiry for over sixty years.  This 
unfortunate figure has been characterized as overconforming (Merton 1940), insecure 
(Thompson 1977), and timid (Downs 1994), resulting in an unwillingness to depart even slightly 
from organizational rules. The persistence of this imagery is ironic given empirical evidence 
suggesting that s(he) does not exist in significant numbers in public or private organizations 
(Bozeman and Rainey 1998; Foster and Jones 1978; Allinson 1984, 1986; Stone and Feldman 
1976; Foster 1990). Thus, the bureaucratic personality can be considered something of public 
administration’s Sasquatch: a scary fleeting image to which our collective scholarly imaginations 
remain captive.  
This article turns attention to an equally intriguing and arguably more favorable figure in 
public sector settings: the unbureaucratic personality.  The unbureaucratic personality is a timely 
topic given the worldwide push for the public sector to “reinvent” itself by decentralizing 
decision-making and increasing worker discretion (Frederickson and Smith 2004, 207). Voices 
within the reinventing government literature call for a new type of government worker, one who 
is creative, entrepreneurial, and flexible (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Cohen and Eimicke 1995).  
These latter descriptors from the popular literature imply that competent public servants will 
bend rules in the name of “customer service” and exercise significant discretion to achieve 
governmental results. Furthermore, massive rule bending is part and parcel of images of the 
trailblazing entrepreneurial public manager (Diver 1982). For these reasons, this paper focuses 
on conceptualizing the unbureaucratic public servant, one characterized by a tendency to bend 
organizational rules.  
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Before engaging in this conceptualization, it should be clarified that the bureaucratic and 
unbureaucratic personalities are not flip sides of the same ideational coin. While the bureaucratic 
personality concept has evolved over time to represent an alienated individual that uses undue 
organizational rule abidance to overcome a sense of powerlessness (Bozeman and Rainey 1998), 
the unbureaucratic personality is a priori unattached to any particular dispositional trait. Given 
that this article seeks to craft an inductive portrait, the unbureaucratic personality is not –
conceptualized as antagonist to the bureaucratic personality. 
It is also important to note that rule bending – like rule following -- can be 
organizationally pathological (Cohen 1965, Bensman and Rosenberg 1963) or beneficial (Merton 
1940, Goodsell 2004). While definitive normative judgments are beyond the scope of this article, 
the intent here is to delve into the nature of the unbureaucratic personality by exploring its 
dispositional and organizational precursors.  The dispositional factors considered by this study 
include nonconformity, risk-taking propensity, and public service commitment, all which are 
expected to increase the unbureaucratic personality. Organizational factors considered include 
centralization and formalization, which are expected to suppress the unbureaucratic personality, 
and red tape, which is expected to stimulate the unbureaucratic personality.  The extent to which 
organization structure influences the unbureaucratic personality will suggest the reactionary 
nature and possible manipulability of rule-bending behavior, while the influence of individual 
disposition on the unbureaucratic personality will indicate its inherent nature (in addition to its 
potential uncontrollability).  
A study of the employees of four cities in a Midwestern U.S. state provides the data for 
examining the unbureaucratic personality. In-person interviews with ninety employees in a range 
of hierarchical positions yielded qualitative background information, with a mail survey of all 
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city employees generating the study’s qualitative data. Response rates for the survey averaged 49 
percent (n=645). Mail survey data are statistically analyzed to test hypotheses pertaining to the 
influences of individual disposition and workplace structure on a city employee’s willingness to 
bend organizational rules.  
The article begins by exploring images of rule bending in the literature. The second 
section outlines hypotheses pertaining to rule bending, while the third section details the study’s 
research design. The fourth section reports the results of statistical modeling, with the fifth 
section discussing the results in light of the hypotheses posed. The sixth and final section 
provides concluding remarks.  
 
Rule Bending in the Literature 
Given that rule rigidity is the common characteristic of bureaucratic personality portrayals, it 
follows that a key characteristic of the un-bureaucratic personality is rule bending, defined as a 
willingness to depart from rules and procedures. There is substantial evidence that employees at 
all hierarchical levels bend rules, although it appears to be more the exception than the rule (Blau 
1963, Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 92, March 1994, 73). This section reviews images of 
rule bending in public administration, with an eye towards identifying common elements that 
may reflect the unbureaucratic personality.  
 Thompson (1977), who portrayed bureaupathic rule sticklers, also provides an 
unflattering rule-bending personality: the bureautic (which presumably rhymes with neurotic). 
This person is immature and insistent on immediate gratification, childhood traits not outgrown 
in adulthood. Given that this person detests control, organizational life is torturous and all 
organizational demands are perceived as red tape. Rules and processes remind the bureautic that 
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s(he) is not in control and dependent on others. Characterized by low levels of abstraction and a 
preference for personalized relationships, the bureautic cannot understand the need for rule 
requirements and interprets them as impugning his or her trustworthiness and dignity. Thus the 
bureautic does not bother to learn rules or rule purposes and, as a result, constantly violates them 
(1977: 175).   
 Blau’s study of bureaucracy in the textile division of a state unemployment agency 
features front-desk receptionists who shortened mandatory minimum timeframes before which 
jobless clients could return to the agency (1963, 29). This rule deviation had the effect of 
increasing receptionist morale by making them feel like they were doing something positive for 
downtrodden clients. The first-line supervisors, understanding the value of receptionist morale 
and figuring that this deviation did not interfere with their own tasks, allowed and even justified 
the deviation by noting the lack of a simple rule for “due-date” assignment. The department head 
reacted negatively to the rule deviation because the receptionists’ discretionary assignments of 
due dates flooded the division with clients, resulting in inequitable treatment of clients (in some 
instances based on race). Her response was to clarify the original procedure and eventually 
eliminate screener discretion. This scenario led Blau to conclude that perceptions of rule bending 
will depend on one’s place in the hierarchy and how rule bending affects immediate work 
objectives. 
 Cohen (1965, 1970) replicated Blau’s study in a different branch of the same 
unemployment agency that Blau studied. Cohen observed similar forms of rule deviation, as well 
as more egregious rule-bending involving racial discrimination. In Cohen’s division, 
unemployment counselors violated state law by failing to report racially biased employer hiring 
practices and secretly coding high school job fair attendees by race. With regards to their failure 
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to report discriminatory hiring practices, unemployment agents went one step further and 
instructed employers on how to racially discriminate without getting caught. In this case, the 
counselors believed their actions to be prosocial: to avoid getting important community 
employers in trouble, to retain discriminating clients, and to spare the feelings and cabfare of 
nonwhites who would not be hired.  
 Bensman’s and Rosenberg’s (1963) rule benders are employees who are attempting to 
compensate for their sense of organizational powerless or for their lack of identification with 
their employing organization (p. 313). For example, front-line workers will break rules in order 
to “cut slack” to clients or subordinates with less power than themselves, either as a means to 
empower themselves or identify with the client. This rule-bending can encompass failure to 
carefully review client claims for resources or covering up for subordinates who make mistakes. 
From the perspective of Bensman and Rosenberg, such rule bending costs the organization 
dearly, but is viewed sympathetically and favorably by society (p. 314).  
 Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s rule benders are street-level bureaucrats – cops, 
teachers, and counselors -- who define themselves as agents of the citizen-clients they serve 
(2003).  In this capacity, street-level bureaucrats judge the worthiness or unworthiness of clients 
in deciding whether to bend rules. Agents bend rules for worthy clients – sometimes at 
significant professional risks -- for whom following the rules would render an outcome 
incompatible with the street-level agent’s beliefs about how the situation should turn out. By 
contrast, agents rigidly comply with rules when clients do not merit rule bending or deserve 
punishment that can be achieved by rigid rule application. The extent to which street-level 
bureaucrats perceive citizens as worthy or unworthy can depend on the client’s seeming 
sincerity, their responsiveness to requirements, the agent’s estimation of the likelihood for 
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individual behavioral change, and the client’s seeming respect for the agent’s authority. In the 
final analysis, rules are a secondary consideration to the agent’s moral assessment of client 
worthiness in determining how public services will be administered to individual citizens.  
 These rule-bending portrayals raise several themes potentially relevant to the 
unbureaucratic personality. With the exception of Thompson’s bureautic – who thoughtlessly 
violates rules because s(he) has not bothered to learn them – the remaining rule benders 
knowingly violate procedure, thus rule bending is conceptualized as intentional behavior.  
Thompson lends the notion that rule bending may be purely a function of individual disposition, 
while Blau and Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s rule bending seeks to overcome procedures 
perceived as barriers to job performance. The normative view of rule bending is mixed: Blau and 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno acknowledge that rule bending entails organizational winners and 
losers, while Thompson, Cohen and Bensman and Rosenberg emphasize the negative 
organizational and societal costs of the behavior. These themes will be revisited shortly. For 
now, the next section hypothesizes specific correlates of rule-bending, drawing on rule bending 
behavior from a range of social science disciplines.  
 
Hypothetical Influences on the Unbureaucratic Personality 
In the tradition of bureaucratic personality scholarship, personality is conceptualized as 
outwardly observable behavior that is influenced by both personal disposition and environment 
(Allinson 1986, 43). Accordingly, the unbureaucratic personality is defined as rule bending 
intentions and attitudes that are expected to be influenced by both individual disposition and 
organizational structure. This section explores the theoretical foundations of these expectations, 
beginning with individual disposition.  
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Disposition and Rule Bending.  Nonconformity, risk propensity, and public service commitment 
are attributes of individual public employees thought to influence rule bending. Conformity and 
risk propensity have long been called upon as explanations for rule behavior, although with 
varying levels of success (Knapp 1964, Knapp 1963, Mulder 1971, Gordon 1970).  And while 
public service commitment has not been addressed in the rule bending literatures, it has been 
admiringly, anecdotally, and implicitly noted in profiles of public servants who shatter 
bureaucratic stereotype (Goodsell 2004, 107).  
 Nonconformity is a logical starting point for examining disobedient behavior. The 
scholarly definition of nonconformity is the extent to which individual behavior is driven by 
internal rather than external standards (Kohn 1977, 35). Thus, from the standpoint of a 
nonconformist, “the system” does not determine whether s(he) follows the rules.  To illustrate, a 
study of enlisted navy men found that those disciplined for violating rules displayed more 
nonconformist traits than those not subject to disciplinary action (Knapp 1963, 1964). Staw and 
Boettger note that task revision (which includes rule bending) by definition involves a certain 
degree of nonconformity to resist social norms and practices (1990: 538). Conversely, Gordon 
found that study subjects that valued conforming behavior displayed more “bureaucratic 
orientation,” defined in part by the desire for security that rule compliance affords (Gordon 
1970). Assembling these strands of evidence, it is expected that public employees with more 
nonconforming dispositions will exhibit more unbureaucratic personalities (H1). 
 An individual’s propensity for risk, which is thought to take seed in early life and 
germinate in adulthood (March 1994, 41), is another potential explanation for rule behavior.  
Conceptually, risk aversion has been associated with rule rigidity: Down’s conservers – typically 
middle managers lacking promotion potential – avoided rule deviation to protect their 
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organizational positions (1967). Risk aversion also plays into portrayals of “complacent” street-
level bureaucrats, typically minority or non-college educated workers who engage in an 
“acquiescent and unimaginative use of agency procedure” to secure their position and 
occupational status (Stone and Feldbaum 1976). By contrast, the rule-bending entrepreneurial 
public manager is envisioned as an inherent risk taker, with empirical evidence correlating 
individual risk-taking propensity with procedural violations (Mulder 1971) and pro-social rule 
breaking (Morrison 2006). And while it is uncertain that Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s citizen 
agents have more risk-taking dispositions, they clearly took professional risks in bending the 
rules to provide justice for their clients (2003, 19). So did O’Leary’s “Nevada Four”, who risked 
their jobs by violating standard operating procedures (along with strategies) to protect wetlands 
from the Bureau of Reclamation’s irrigation practices (2004: 38). For these reasons, it is 
hypothesized that public employees with greater risk-taking propensities will exhibit more 
unbureaucratic personalities (H2).  
 In contrast with nonconformity and risk taking, public service commitment is a novel 
explanation for rule bending behavior. Public service commitment is a dimension of public 
service motivation, defined as an unmet psychological need that is uniquely or partially fulfilled 
in public sector work (Perry and Wise 1990; Perry 1996). Commitment to public service may 
influence rule bending by inspiring employees to go above and beyond the call of duty – 
including bending rules – to further the public interest. While not pertaining to rule bending, the 
public service motivation literature clearly expects employees with higher PSM to be better 
performers (Perry and Wise 1990, Naff and Crum 1999), an expectation that has received some 
support (Naff and Crum 1999, Alonso and Lewis 2001, Frank and Lewis 2004). While the link 
between high performance and rule-bending is unclear, evidence suggests a relationship between 
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commitment and unbureaucratic behavior. For example, Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s street-
level bureaucrats bent rules based on their own personal commitment to clients perceived as 
worthy (2003). A similar example is found in Hutchinson’s study of rule bending among nurses, 
in which she argues that “A principled level nurse … questions rules that do not serve human 
values” (1990: 4). By contrast, Down’s rule-rigid middle managers had no such sense of 
commitment, either to clients or their agency (1994, 100). In the most direct evidence linking a 
desire to serve and rule bending, private sector employees cited excellent customer service as 
their reason for bending rules (Morrison 2006). This evidence leads to the expectation that public 
employees with higher public service commitment will exhibit more unbureaucratic personalities 
(H3). 
 
Organizational Structure.  Organizational structure is expected to suppress the unbureaucratic 
personality by signaling organizational expectations and posing noncompliance consequences. 
Consider that males confined for misbehavior (in a naval brig, a juvenile detention center, a state 
security hospital, and a prison reception center) were found more likely to think rules should be 
strictly followed than nonconfined high school and college-aged males (Gordon 1960). Given 
that the confined males were societal rule benders functioning in highly controlled environments, 
the result suggests that organization control significantly influences attitudes towards rule 
compliance. Three types of structure are expected to affect rule bending: formalization and 
centralization, which are expected to suppress the unbureaucratic personality, and red tape, 
conceptualized as active but ineffective structure (Bozeman 2000) and expected to stimulate the 
unbureaucratic personality.  
 Formalization is defined as the extent of written rules, regulations and procedures in an 
organization (Pugh, Hickson and Vinings 1969, 116). Formalization has been associated with 
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lower rates of inappropriate rule bending in the private service sector (Kelley, Longfellow and 
Malehorn 1996), a phenomenon potentially attributable to the veneer of neutral authority and 
distraction from individual power that formalization provides (Gouldner 1954, 165). Rather than 
an imperfect human being supplying a mandate, requirements emanate from impersonal, 
seemingly unbiased written instructions. The foremen in Gouldner’s industrial bureaucracy 
understood this phenomenon well and would not hesitate to blame written rules for directives 
that underlings resisted (1954, 166). Based on this rationale, this study predicts that public 
employees in workplaces with higher formalization will exhibit less unbureaucratic personalities 
(H4). 
 While formalization is thought to distract from power disparities, centralization – the 
upward locus of decision power -- illuminates them. With power inequity front and center, fears 
of violating organizational norms and incurring noncompliance consequences may lower a 
public employee’s willingness to bend rules.  The assertion is supported by studies detecting 
more rigid and conformist senior managers in highly centralized settings (Ellis and Child 1973) 
and lower rates of rule-bending among private sector employees with less decision-making 
autonomy (Morrinson 2006).  On a contradictory note, Allinson found centralization to be 
correlated with less bureaucratic orientation among public and private sector employees, a result 
he attributed to decentralized organizations recruiting bureaucratic personalities and vice versa 
(1984, 95). It should be noted, however, that Allinson’s measure of centralization pertained to 
the number of core organizational decisions, such as such as the creation of a new department or 
product pricing, that were made at the highest hierarchical levels. This study, by contrast, 
borrows Aiken and Haige’s conceptualization of centralization as pertaining to workplace 
decisionmaking (1966, 498), a choice which aligns with other studies finding a link between 
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centralization and unbureaucratic tendencies (Ellis and Child 1973, Morrinson 2006). 
Accordingly, it is expected that public employees working in more centralized workplaces will 
exhibit less unbureaucratic personalities (H5). 
 Red tape, defined as active but ineffective organizational rules (Bozeman 2000), is also 
thought to influence rule bending.  Bending rules perceived as red tape may represent a form of 
task revision, a behavior in which employees alter procedures that they perceive to be faulty 
(Staw and Boettger 1990), or a value conflict, which leads public servants to violate rules that 
hinder public goals (Thacher and Rein 2004). These contentions are supported by a study of 
nurses who bent rules perceived as interfering with their ability to care for patients (Hutchinson 
1990), as well as Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s citizen agents, who bent rules that violated 
their sense of how the situation “ought” to end (2003). This evidence leads to the final 
expectation, that public employees encountering higher levels of workplace red tape will exhibit 
more unbureaucratic personalities (H6) 
 
Research Design 
The data for examining the unbureaucratic personality were collected through a study of the 
employees of four cities in a Midwestern U.S. state: a small agricultural community (City A); a 
small city with a light industrial economic base (City B); a mid-size city located near a military 
base (City C); and an affluent metropolitan city (City D). These cities were included based on 
their willingness to participate in the study. While the participation of four cities in a single state 
has implications for the study’s external validity, it strengthens internal validity by holding state-
level factors constant. The study entailed ninety in-person interviews with city employees from a 
range of hierarchical levels and departments, and a mail survey distributed to all employees of 
each city. The study was executed between June 2005 and December 2006.  
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 The interview process was designed to generate qualitative data for the larger research 
project (a study of workplace rules) and inform development of the mail survey instrument. 
Within each city, interview invitations were sent to a random sample of employees. Interviews 
were held in conference rooms located away from employee worksites. At the outset of each 
interview, the researcher explained the study purposes, the confidentiality of results, and the 
terms of the interview consent form, and provided the employee time to ask questions about the 
study. Once the interview consent form was signed by both researcher and employee, the 
employee was asked semi-structured, open-ended questions about their role in the organization, 
the type of rules they encountered in the workplace, and their impressions of workplace rules.  
 The mail survey instrument asked questions about workplace characteristics, personal 
attributes, and attitudes towards rules and rule bending. (The interview protocol is provided in 
Appendix 1). The survey process began with an alert letter from the city manager’s office to 
employees expressing support for the study and encouraging participation. Within two weeks, an 
envelope was attached to employee paychecks that contained a personalized cover letter from the 
researcher inviting survey participation and stressing the confidentiality of results; the mail 
survey; a stamped return envelope addressed to the researcher’s university; and a postcard with a 
survey identification number that employees were asked to return separately from the mail 
survey. Thus completed surveys were returned anonymously, while the separate postcards 
enabled survey responses to be tracked.1 This process produced response rates of 61 percent in 
City A, 83 percent in City B, 43 percent in City C, and 45 percent in City D. The overall 
response rate was 49 percent (n=645).  While it is difficult to discern the factors that account for 
these differential response rates, Cities A and B have fewer employees while Cities C and D 
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have more employees. Consequently, response rates may be a function of the ease of 
encouraging survey participation.  
 
Qualitative Evidence  
Before delving into statistical analysis, it is worthwhile to discuss city employee perspectives on 
rule bending gleaned from in-person interviews. Interviews were unstructured and focused on 
employee perceptions of good versus bad rules (however they defined those terms). While 
interviews maintained a general focus, employees indirectly revealed their tendencies towards 
rule compliance or deviation.  
 Consistent with the study hypotheses, some employees attributed their stance on rules to 
their own dispositions. To illustrate, a journeyman in a parks and recreation department 
explained that it was “his nature” to question rules that had been on the books for a while. A 
utility billing clerk stated that she follows the rules because “that’s how I am”.  A public works 
secretary noted that she likes rules because they are part her, giving her structure, balance, 
standards and order. Another secretary in a traffic unit commented that she liked rules because 
she is an organization “freak” and likes to have things “in order”.   
 Some city employees cited their own conforming dispositions in explaining their attitudes 
towards rules. One parks and recreation supervisor explained that she was not one to “buck the 
system” when it comes to rules, indicating her submission to the external system in determining 
rule compliance. Further up the organizational hierarchy, a public works assistant director noted 
that he does not think of rules as bad because they are “needed for society.”  Institutional 
indoctrination surfaced as a driver of individual conformity, from the administrative program 
coordinator who remarked that she did not think of rules as good or bad because her family 
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prepared her to “respect the mission,” or the building code inspector who noted that he was 
“army-trained” to follow procedure.  
  Confessions of rule bending were less common, but revealed two rationales consistent 
with the hypotheses. The first rationale for rule bending was to cut through perceived red tape. 
For example, a parks and recreation supervisor noted that official procedures for awarding 
compensation time (which gives future time off in exchange for overtime worked today) were 
burdensome and useless, leading him to track comp time off-the-record. The supervisor did not 
regard the centralized regulation as effective and thus regarded the procedure as expendable. 
Similarly, a street department worker reported sneaking out from under his boss’s watchful eye 
to trim trees that hung over the sidewalk, thus violating the rule to first obtain permission from 
the property owners:  
 
Property owners are never there and the department head doesn’t like to 
see tree limbs hanging over the sidewalk. The rule makes no sense; the 
tree limbs are blocking public space. 
 
In this instance, the rule had a goal indiscernible to the street worker, one that clashed with his 
department head’s preferences, thereby making it ineffective and eligible for bending. In another 
example, a maintenance technician, aggravated by perceived incessant reminders to wear a 
seatbelt while driving city trucks, would comply for most trips, but: 
 
One day I had driven across the street without my seatbelt on and the 
head of my work unit was coming out of the building from a meeting. He 
asked me whether I’d been wearing my seat belt. I just lied and said yes 
to avoid the stink…. I can see where they are coming from, but 
sometimes it’s petty. 
 
In the maintenance technician’s view, the rule became ineffective when it sought to impose 
“petty” control over him, leading him to ignore the rule and lie to the boss about his compliance. 
These examples suggest that city employees make judgments about bending rules based on their 
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perceptions of rule effectiveness, with ineffective rules regarded as justifiability – albeit 
clandestinely -- bent.  
 In alignment with the public service commitment hypothesis, some city employees 
admitted to bending rules to benefit their cities or the communities they served.  Consider the 
comments of the transportation and maintenance foreman, who notes: 
 
Only streets that are dedicated to the city are supposed to be maintained 
by the city. But if there’s a hole in town, whether it’s dedicated or not, I 
deal with it. I’ll just sneak out and fill the hole. I try to make the town 
look better. 
 
This same employee expressed concern for the effect of poorly maintained sidewalks on 
wheelchair-bound citizens. The executive secretary in a public works department who worked 
overtime without the prerequisite permission displays a similar conviction:  
I knew major projects were coming up and I had three choices: not do the 
job, do the job and ask for overtime or comptime, or do the job and ask 
for nothing. Given the city’s budget issues, I chose to stay late on a 
Friday, which was a holiday, and not ask for anything in return. I am a 
loyal, dedicated employee concerned for the community and social 
engineering, I’ve given my best. 
 
In these examples, employees bent rules to serve broader purposes, even though they had nothing 
to gain and, in fact, something to lose for their actions: the administrative assistant’s boss later 
chastised her for not clearing her volunteer holiday work with him and the foreman later noted 
that, “If I get my ass chewed for filling potholes, so be it.” 
 These stories put “flesh on the bones” of the theoretical hypotheses. The next section 
explores how well the hypotheses hold up to statistical scrutiny.  
 
Models and Measures 
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The unbureaucratic personality is modeled as a function of employee disposition and 
organizational structure. The dispositional variables include nonconformity, risk propensity and 
public service commitment. Organizational attributes are formalization, centralization, and red 
tape. The statistical model used is ordered probit regression, which is appropriate for analyzing 
ordinal data, for which the exact differences between variable levels is unknown (Long 1997, 
114).  
 The unbureaucratic personality is measured as the sum of survey respondents’ levels of 
agreement or disagreement with nine statements (coded from 0= strongly disagree to 3= strongly 
agree) that tap attitudes and intentions towards rule bending (table 1). The statements tap motives 
for bending rules that are both selfish (e.g., I will bend a rule if it makes my job easier) and 
altruistic (e.g., I will bend a rule if it helps me do a better job for the city) as well as neutral 
(When I don’t understand a rule’s purpose, I question it.).  The minimum possible scale value is 
0 and the maximum possible scale value is 27. The statements were adapted from studies of 
bureaucratic orientation by Baker (1972) and Gordon (1970), as well as from patterns of 
comments made by city employees during the interview process. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale 
is 0.76. 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
 Nonconformity is measured by summing responses to a survey question that asks city 
employees to rate themselves on a five-point scale between the following opposite 
characteristics: 
Going Along-Arguing 
Accepting the System-Questioning the System 
Stable-Changing 




Each item is coded from 0 to 4, thus nonconformity scale values range from 0 to 20. The scale is 
adapted from Ellis and Child’s study of managerial conformity (1973).  Cronbach’s alpha for the 
scale is 0.83.  
 Risk propensity is measured as a survey respondents’ level of agreement or disagreement 
(0=Strongly Disagree to 3=Strongly Agree) with the statement “I like taking risks at work,” 
adapted from Ellis and Child (1973).  
 Public service commitment is measured using a scale that sums survey respondents’ 
levels of agreement or disagreement (from 0=strongly disagree to 3=strongly agree) with the 
following statements: 
Public service is important to my self-image. 
I am proud to be a public servant. 
I dislike being a public servant (Reversed) 
I do not identify with being a public servant. (Reversed) 
I am enthusiastic about public service. 
 
The scale was borrowed from Meyer, Allen and Smith (1993), who devised it to measure 
emotional commitment to an occupation, but acknowledged that researchers wanting to measure 
emotional commitment to specific occupations could do so by simply substituting the appropriate 
descriptor (in this case, “public service”). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.81.  
 Centralization is measured as the sum of survey participants’ level of agreement 
(Strongly Disagree=0 to Strongly Agree=3) with the following statements: 
 
I must check with my supervisor before I do almost anything. 
 
In general, an employee wanting to make their own decisions in my workplace would be 
quickly discouraged. 
 
Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a final answer. 
 
Only supervisors can decide how things are to be done. 
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These statements are adapted from Aiken and Hage (1966). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 
0.73   
 Aiken and Hage (1966) also provide this study’s measure of formalization, reflecting a 
survey respondent’s level of agreement of disagreement with the following statement: Whatever 
situation arises, my department has written policies and procedures to follow.  Responses are 
coded from 0 (Strongly Disagree) to 3 (Strongly Agree).  
 Red tape is measured using by survey responses to the following question:  
 
If “red tape” is defined as burdensome administrative policies and procedures that have negative 
effects on the city’s performance, please assess the level of red tape in the City of ________: 
(Please enter a number in the box between 0 and 10, with 0 indicating no red tape and 10 
indicating the highest level of red tape).  
 
This question was adapted from Rainey, Pandey and Bozeman (1995).  
 The control variables for the model include gender (0=male, 1=female); three 
occupational statuses measured in two dummy variables, one for supervisors or department 
heads, one for administrative or policy staff, otherwise front-line workers; length of city 
employment in years; college education (1=bachelors degree, some graduate school or graduate 
degree, otherwise=0); professional association membership; and city of employment, measured 
in three dummy variables and ordered by increasing number of employees.  
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the model variables. The unbureaucratic 
personality variable exhibits a normal distribution with a mean and median roughly equal to 12, 
which is slightly less than half the maximum scale value of 27. The average nonconformity scale 
value is somewhat lower than the mid-range scale value (8.5), indicating a slight tendency in 
favor of conformity. The average public service commitment variable indicates high public 
service commitment among survey respondents.  City workplaces appear more decentralized 
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than centralized and divided roughly evenly between higher and lower formalization, with a 
slight tendency towards higher red tape.  
[Table 3 Here] 
 With regards to control variables, female employees are slightly overrepresented in the 
sample, comprising 28 percent of the sample compared with 25 percent of the city employee 
population. Survey respondents average ten years on the job, with tenures extending to 38 years. 
The distribution of respondents by hierarchy mimics a pyramid structure, with descending 
percentages of front-line workers, supervisors, administrative or policy staff, and department 
heads. The sample appears well-educated, with over half having college degrees and nearly sixty 
percent indicating membership in a professional association (which for city employees typically 
indicates union membership). Six percent of the sample responses come from City A, 14 percent 
from City B, 21 percent from City C, and 59 percent from City D. 
 
Results 
The ordered probit model results, provided in table 4, indicate that employee disposition 
influences the unbureaucratic personality in expected and unexpected ways.  Nonconformity and 
risk-taking propensity significantly correlate with the unbureaucratic personality, as 
hypothesized (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively). However, public service commitment 
negatively correlates with the unbureaucratic personality, contradicting expectations (p<0.10).  
[Table 4 Here] 
 
 The organizational structure hypotheses also receive mixed support. As hypothesized, red 
tape is positively correlated with the unbureaucratic personality scale (p<0.10). However, 
centralization, is correlated with higher levels of the unbureaucratic personality, contradicting 
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expectations (p<0.01). Formalization exhibits a negative correlation to the unbureaucratic 
personality, as expected, although at borderline statistical significance (p<0.10 for a one-tailed 
test). Of the control variables, only gender is a statistically significant influence (p<0.01), with 
city employees who are women indicating lower unbureaucratic personality scale values.  
 Examining fully standardized coefficients of the explanatory variables, nonconformity 
exerts the largest relative influence on the unbureaucratic personality, followed by centralization 
with the second largest fully standardized coefficient.  McKelvey and Zavoina's R2, which for 
ordinal outcomes most closely approximates the ordinary least squares (OLS) R2 statistic (Long 
& Freese, 2003, 163), is 0.25 for this model.2 
 
Discussion 
Beginning with dispositional influences on the unbureaucratic personality, nonconformity 
appears to increase the unbureaucratic personality, as expected. The result makes sense and is 
consistent with previous studies (1963, 1964). Gordon 1970): nonconformists behave in ways 
that fit their own internal standards and not the external constraints imposed by the managerial 
systems in which they reside. Risk propensity also correlates with the unbureaucratic personality, 
as expected, suggesting that those individuals inclined to take workplace risks are more willing 
to bend rules than those more risk averse. This result too is consistent with prior research 
(Mulder 1971, Morrison 2006) and supports the notion that rule bending is a deliberate, 
calculated action.  
 Perhaps the most striking result is the influence of public service commitment, which 
contradicts expectations with its negative correlation to the unbureaucratic personality. One 
explanation for the result is that individuals who indicate commitment to public service have 
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been indoctrinated to the “ethic” of consistent rule application, which seeks the equitable 
delivery of public goods and services. While such a conclusion is beyond the evidence presented 
here, the implication is provocative and merits further examination. 
Out of the environmental variables, centralization appears to foster the unbureaucratic 
personality while formalization appears to suppress it. This contrast may speak to the very 
different nature of these control mechanisms. As Gouldner observed in his study of industrial 
bureaucracy, formalization may be a more palatable form of authority than centralization 
because it emanates from seemingly impersonal rules and procedures, as opposed to the very 
personal and seemingly more fallible human command that arises in centralized settings.  Thus, 
centralization may trigger rebellious behavior while formalization reduces it. 
 Red tape appears to trigger the unbureaucratic personality, as expected. The implication 
of the result depends on whether the red tape perceived by rule benders exists objectively. True 
red tape that triggers rule-bending tendencies may indicate a healthy response to an 
organizational pathology. By contrast, the violation of effective rules perceived as red tape – 
even with good intentions -- represents a chink in the armor of organizational control. The 
manner in which the unbureaucratic personality diagnoses and responds to red tape is an 
intriguing question for future research.  
What do these results imply for government reinvention efforts? First, government 
reformists who blame risk-averse bureaucrats for organizational lethargy (Cohen and Eimicke 
1995) should consider that nonconforming, risk-taking bureaucrats appear more likely to bend 
organizational rules. Given that the unbureaucratic personality encompasses both selfish and 
altruistic rule-bending, such behavior may be organizationally beneficial or pathological. 
Second, government reformists who advocate de-bureaucratizing public agencies should note 
 21
that, while decentralization appears to lower rule-bending, so does formalization. Thus, advice to 
reduce written organizational rules to increase flexibility and efficiency may unintentionally 
reduce cooperation with organizational mandates. Third, if public employees have a greater 
commitment to public service than private employees (an assertion for which there is evidence 
(see Boyne (2002) for a review), then these results undermine the assumption of privatization 
that public and private sector employees are essentially fungible. Consequently if rule-bending is 
the managerial goal (a paradoxical proposition if there ever was one), then private contractors 
may wish to seek out employees with less public service commitment.  
  Beyond the confines of government reinvention, how do these results portray the 
unbureaucratic personality? Much like psychological inkblots tests, the answer depends on the 
interpreter, particularly with regard to normative judgments about rule-bending among public 
employees. For those uncomfortable with public employee discretion, the unbureaucratic 
personality may appear to be a rebel that reacts negatively to authority, disregards rules 
arbitrarily deemed ineffective, and lacks commitment to the public good. For interpreters 
unperturbed by public employee discretion, this character may appear the heroic risk taker, 
cutting red tape with a machete, and resists the constraints of indoctrination to public service. In 
the absence of a fuller understanding of the motivations of rule bending, it is unclear which 
portrait (if not both) more faithfully reflects reality.  
 Three caveats are in order. First, the study sample comprises the employees of four cities 
of a single Midwestern U.S. state. While the employees participating in the study are 
hierarchically diverse, the sample is limited by its geographic and local government emphasis. 
Future studies should expand the types of government sector employees studied, as well as the 
geographic locations of study. Second, a fuller understanding of unbureaucratic behavior could 
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benefit from alternative explanations such as managerial legitimacy, organizational formality, 
and individual justice motivations. Such explanatory emphases would strengthen understanding 
of the normative dimensions to rule bending behavior. Third, it may be time to move away from 
as the term “personality”, which this article employs to highlight rule behavior opposite that of 
the bureaucratic personality. However, given the role of both dispositional and environmental 
factors in rule-bending, a more appropriate label for future work may very well be the 
unbureaucratic public servant.  
 
Conclusion 
It is striking how little empirical public administration research has been devoted to 
unbureaucratic behavior. Perhaps this inattentiveness is due to the inherent paradox of a behavior 
that is individually admired but collectively feared. Who among us does not like rules to be bent 
in our favor? Yet bent rules make tiny cracks in organizational systems, which can accumulate to 
major fissures in hierarchical power structures. Herein lies another potential explanator for the 
intellectual dormancy of unbureaucratic behavior: the emphasis on a phenomenon that is beyond 
hierarchical control and inherently difficult to evaluate. Is such behavior largely pathological? 
Mostly beneficial? A little of both? While this article begins to sketch a portrait of the 
unbureaucratic personality, definitive judgments about its nature and consequences have yet to 
be made. Given the inevitability of rule bending behavior and its paradoxical place in the world 
of public administration, unbureaucratic behavior deserves wider scrutiny. This article takes a 
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Table 1. Unbureaucratic Personality Survey Question Items 
Scale Item Source 
Even if I dislike a rule, I usually obey it. Baker 1972 
Often, the only thing wrong with breaking rules is getting 
caught.  
Baker 1972 
Following the rules is a matter of personal principal.  Gordon 1970 
If employees just followed all of the city’s rules, we would be a 
more effective organization.  
Gordon 1970 
Employees are better off when the city provides a complete set 
of rules to be followed.  
Gordon 1970 
I will bend a rule if it helps to make _______ (city name) a 
better community.  
City employee interviews 
When I don’t understand a rule’s purpose, I question it.  City employee interviews 
I will bend a rule if it helps me do a better job for the city.  City employee interviews 
I could be more effective in my job if there were fewer policies 
and procedures.  
City employee interviews 
If I think a rule is pointless, I will find a way around it.  Baker 1972 
I figure that rules are there for a purpose.  Gordon 1970 
I will bend a rule if it makes my job easier.  City employee interviews 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables 
 Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Skewness 
The Unbureaucratic 
Personality Scale 11.95 12 3.90 2 25 0.21 
Nonconformity 6.64 6 3.63 0 17 0.13 
Risk Propensity 1.46 1 0.87 0 3 -0.04 
Public Service 
Commitment 10.92 11 3.04 1 15 -0.62 
Centralization 4.18 4 2.68 0 12 0.40 
Formalization 1.54 2 0.81 0 3 -0.15 
Red Tape 6.03 6 2.47 0 10 -0.31 
Female Employees 0.28 0 0.45 0 1 0.97 
Length of City 
Employment 10.32 8 8.32 1 38 0.76 
Department Heads 0.06 0 0.24 0 1 3.58 
Supervisors 0.25 0 0.43 0 1 1.17 
Administrative/Policy 
Staff 
0.09 0 0.28 0 1 6.46 




0.58 1 0.49 0 1 -0.32 
College Education 0.56 1 0.50 0 1 -0.24 
City A 0.06 0 0.23 0 1 3.88 
City B 0.14 0 0.35 0 1 2.08 
City C 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 1.42 
City D 0.59 1 0.49 0 1 -0.38 
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Table 3. Ordered Probit Model of the Unbureaucratic Personality
Beta Std. Beta z p(Z) B(xy)
Nonconformity 0.06 0.01 5.99 *** 0.30
Risk Propensity 0.16 0.06 2.81 0.01 0.12
Public Service Commitment -0.03 0.02 -1.74 0.08 -0.08
Centralization 0.06 0.02 3.41 *** 0.15
Formalization -0.09 0.06 -1.62 0.11 -0.07
Red Tape 0.04 0.02 1.84 0.07 0.08
Gender -0.43 0.11 -3.81 *** -0.16
Length of City Employment 0.00 0.01 -0.85 0.39 -0.03
Department Head Status -0.14 0.19 -0.75 0.45 -0.03
Supervisor Status -0.01 0.12 -0.09 0.93 0.00
Frontline Worker -0.13 0.14 -0.91 0.37 -0.04
Administrative or Policy Staff Status -0.10 0.12 -0.89 0.37 -0.04
College Education 0.05 0.09 0.59 0.55 0.02
Professional Association Membership -0.09 0.09 -0.94 0.35 -0.04
City B -0.15 0.22 -0.70 0.49 -0.04
City C -0.15 0.19 -0.78 0.44 -0.05
City D -0.04 0.17 -0.23 0.82 -0.02
Notes: McKelvey and Zavoina's R2=0.26; n=517; White's robust standard errors used to counteract 
heteroskedasticity; *** =p<0.01; probabilities reported for a two-tailed test; B(xy) represents fully 








Introduction. Describe study purpose, explain that participation is voluntary, see if they have 
questions before beginning, explain interview consent form, sign and have them sign interview 
consent form.  
 
Ask about their role and responsibilities within the organization. 
 
First, I would like to ask you about the rules that you encounter in your job. The rules you think 
of can be regulations, ordinances, or policies that you have to comply with or enforce.  
 
Can you think of a rule (or rules) that you encounter in your job that, in your opinion, is (are) 
good?  What is the rule and what makes it good? 
 
Can you think of a rule (or rules) that you encounter in your job that, in your opinion, is (are) 




1. The study was conducted in partnership with city managers, who participated in order to 
generate employee feedback on a range of workplace issues, e.g., performance evaluation 
processes, career banding systems, and potential policy changes. Paycheck distribution 
was selected in comparison with distribution to home addresses (which was deemed a 
violation of employee privacy) and departmental distribution (which raised concerns that 
employees might be unintentionally or intentionally discouraged to participate if seen 
taking or declining to take a survey package).  Paycheck distribution also offered the 
advantage of anonymity to superiors: since completed surveys were mailed directly to the 
principle investigator, supervisors and managers had no way of knowing who did or did 
not participate. The results of survey and interview data analysis suggest that employees 
viewed study participation as a mechanism for expressing their voice in a way that they 
could not do otherwise. For example, critical written comments far outnumbered positive 
comments, with several employees attaching a page of typed comments to their surveys. 
2. Ordered probit assumes "parallel regression," meaning that each explanatory variable has 
the same effect on the odds of different values of the dependent variable (Long, 1997, 
140; Long & Freese, 2003, 168). 7. As Long and Freese note, this is a frequently violated 
assumption of ordered probit (p. 168). In response to this model’s violations of the 
parallel regression assumption, the results were replicated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) modeling with robust standard errors. The results are identical in terms of the 
significance and direction of influence of the model variables. A normal probability plot 
of OLS residuals indicates normality and variance inflation factor (VIF) scores suggest 
that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
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